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Leibniz and the Problem of Temporary Truths
Abstract – Not unlike many contemporary philosophers, Leibniz admitted the existence of temporary truths, true
propositions that  have  not  always been or will  not  always be true.  In contrast  with contemporary philosophers,
though, Leibniz conceived of truth in terms of analytic containment: on his view, the truth of a predicative sentence
consists in the analytic containment of the concept expressed by predicate in the concept expressed by the subject.
Given that  analytic relations among concepts are eternal and unchanging,  the problem arises of explaining how
Leibniz reconciled one commitment with the other: how can truth be temporary, if concept-containment is not? This
paper presents a new approach to this problem, based on the idea that a concept can be consistent at one time and
inconsistent at another. It is argued that, given a proper understanding of what it is for a concept to be consistent, this
idea is not as problematic as it may seem at first, and is in fact implied by Leibniz's general views about propositions,
in conjunction with the thesis that some propositions are only temporarily true.
Not unlike many contemporary philosophers, Leibniz admitted the existence of temporary truths, true propositions
that have not always been or will not always be true. In contrast with contemporary philosophers, though, Leibniz
conceived of truth in terms of analytic containment: on his view, for the proposition that Elizabeth is queen to be
true is for the concept  QUEEN to be contained in the concept  ELIZABETH. Given that containment relations among
concepts do not change over time, the problem arises of explaining how Leibniz reconciled one commitment with
the other: how could truth be temporary, if concept-containment is not? Call this the Problem of Temporary Truths. 
Traditional solutions to this problem involve modifying the structure of predicative sentences in various
ways – either by adding a temporal parameter to every predicate (Broad 1949, 1975; Russell 2005) or by replacing
substances with their temporal stages as the primary subjects of predication (Mates 1989; Futch 2008) or else by
relativizing the copula to times or intervals of time (Adams 1994). This paper explores a different approach, based
on  the  idea  that  a  concept  can  be  consistent  at  one  time  and  inconsistent  at  another.  Though  not  entirely
unproblematic, this idea appears to be implied by Leibniz's general theory of propositions, in conjunction with the
thesis  that  some  of  them are  only  temporarily  true.  A careful  examination of  the  alternative  approach,  then,
promises  to  shed  new light  on  a  problem that  admits  of  no obvious  solution and that  bears  crucially  on  the
interpretation of Leibniz's views about time, truth and concept-containment.  
I will proceed as follows. In § 1 I will explain what the Problem of Temporary Truths is and why it arises. §
2 presents the standard solutions and points out the difficulties they face. § 3 goes through the reasons why that the
Problem of Temporary Truths cannot be avoided by ascribing to Leibniz a 'tenseless' theory of propositions. § 4
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presents the alternative solution, clarifies its implications and defends it from some objections. 
1. The Problem of Temporary Truths
As a way of bringing the Problem of Temporary Truths into focus, consider the sentence 'Elizabeth is queen': 
(A) Elizabeth is queen
Since Elizabeth only became queen of England in 1952, the proposition expressed by (A), which is now true, was
false  70  years  ago.  However,  given  Leibniz's  doctrine  that  the  truth of  a  predication  consists  in  the  analytic
containment of the concept expressed by predicate in the concept expressed by the subject (hereafter, the 'concept-
containment  doctrine'),  for  the  proposition  that  Elizabeth is  queen to  be  true  is  for  the  concept  QUEEN to  be
contained in the concept ELIZABETH.1 On the assumption that containment relations among concepts do not change
over time, if the concept QUEEN is now contained in the concept ELIZABETH, it has always been (and will always be)
contained in it.  This means (assuming, once again, the concept-containment doctrine)  that the proposition  that
Elizabeth is queen was already true 70 years ago. But the proposition that Elizabeth is queen was false 70 years
ago. So 70 years ago the proposition that Elizabeth is queen was both truth and false – which is clearly impossible.
This is an instance of the Problem of Temporary Truths.2
Several  factors  contribute  to  generating this  problem.  There would not  be any Problem of  Temporary
Truths  if  Leibniz  had  restricted  the  concept-containment  doctrine  to  truths  featuring essential  predicates  (e.g.
'Elizabeth is human') or predicates that apply eternally, even if not essentially, to their subject (e.g. 'Elizabeth is
blue eyed'). But it is clear that the concept-containment doctrine was not meant to be restricted in this way – as
Leibniz says in Primary Truths, 'the predicate or consequent is always in the subject or antecedent, and the nature
of truth  in general or the connection between the terms of a statement, consists in this very thing' (AG 31; my
1 A  more accurate and detailed formulation of the concept-containment doctrine will be offered in § 4. 
2 I take the Problem of Temporary Truths to be concerned primarily with propositions, and I distinguish these from sentences
and facts. The sentence 'Elizabeth is queen' is a linguistic entity composed by a subject ('Elizabeth') and a predicate ('being
queen'). The fact that Elizabeth is queen is an obtaining state of affairs having as its constituents a substance (Elizabeth) and
a property (being queen). The proposition that Elizabeth is queen is an abstract entity involving two concepts, ELIZABETH
and QUEEN. I take the Problem of Temporary Truths to be concerned primarily with propositions because propositions are
the fundamental bearers of truth and falsity and the entities to which the concept-containment doctrine most directly applies
(strictly speaking, 'Elizabeth' does not contain the predicate 'being queen', nor does Elizabeth contain the property of being
queen; it is the concept ELIZABETH that contains the concept QUEEN). This having being said, there is no doubt that Leibniz's
theory of propositions was of a piece with his philosophy of language and metaphysics:  on his view,  the structure of
propositions reflected the structure of facts and was reflected by the structure of sentences (hence his claim that “the true
Metaphysics is hardly different from the true Logic” (G IV, 292)). Throughout the paper, then, I will move rather freely
across these levels, assuming, with Leibniz, that any thesis about the proposition that A is B and its constituent concepts is
equally, even if indirectly, a  thesis about the sentence 'A is B'  and its parts and the fact that A is B and its components. For
discussion of Leibniz's views on language, and on the relationship of language to philosophy, see Rutherford (1995). 
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Equally, there  there would not be any Problem of Temporary Truths if the relation of  ELIZABETH containing
QUEEN were not supposed to be an analytic relation between these two concepts or if it were somehow possible for
analytic relations to change over time. But Leibniz must have thought of the relation of concept-containment as
analytic, for he took the concept-containment doctrine to imply that all true predications can be proved a priori, i.e.
on the basis of one's grasp of the concepts involved and without the aid of any empirical knowledge (indeed, what
the a priori proof of a true proposition shows is precisely that 'the connection between subject and predicate [...]
has its basis in the natures of both' (AG 46)).3 As to analytic relations, they cannot change over time because they
reflect God's dispositions to think in certain ways, and such dispositions are eternal and unchanging.4
Interestingly, there would not be any Problem of Temporary Truths if Leibniz had offered some special
account of what it is for a truth to be temporary, just as he offered a special account of what it is for a truth to be
contingent. According Leibniz's infinite-analysis account of contingency, a derivative truth is contingent if and only
if it does not admit of a finite a priori proof. So for the proposition expressed by (A) to count as contingently true it
is not necessary that there be any contingency in the relationship of containment that holds between ELIZABETH and
QUEEN. It is only necessary that there be no finite proof that that relationship holds. If Leibniz had suggested some
way for (A) to be temporarily true that did not require ELIZABETH to contain QUEEN at some times and not others, the
Problem of Temporary Truths would not arise. But he never did. And, given that not all contingent truths are also
temporary,5 the infinite-analysis account cannot be simply extended to the treatment of temporariness. 
Finally, and most obviously, there would not be any Problem of Temporary Truths if Leibniz had embraced
what contemporary philosophers would call a 'tenseless' theory of propositions, i.e. a  theory according to which
propositions can only be eternally true or eternally false. But Leibniz never denied the existence of temporary
truths. In fact he positively affirmed their existence and – as we shall see in due course – there are good reasons for
thinking that he could not have done away with them very easily (§ 3). 
The Problem of Temporary Truths is, therefore, a genuine problem and, even if Leibniz does not explicitly
3 For a fuller defence of the claim that Leibniz's relation of concept-containment is (what Kant would have described as) an 
analytic relation, see Couturat (1961, 213-17) and Martin (1966, 48-50). For a critique, see Ishiguro (1981). 
4 See Mates (1986, 49-50). Against this, one could cite a passage of the Principium Scientiae Humanae (1685-6), where 
Leibniz says that in the case of contingent propositions the connection between subject and predicate is not necessary but 
“varies with time [tempore variatur]” (A6.4.671). In the same passage, however, Leibniz also says that, when a truth is 
contingent, the connection between subject and predicate 'depends on God's decree and free will' (ibid.). Plausibly, this does
not mean that analytic relations are at the mercy of God's decisions (Leibniz famously disagrees with Descartes about 
whether it is in God's power to modify the truths of logics and other analytic domains). So we have reason to think that the 
passage should not be taken literally – Leibniz is simply emphasizing the point that the concept-containment doctrine does 
not have necessitarian implications.  
5 The aforementioned proposition that Elizabeth is blue eyed is an example of this: while Elizabeth has always been and will
always be blue eyed, it seems plausible to think that her eyes could have been of a different colour.  
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discuss it in his writings, it is legitimate to ask how he could (and should) have solved it, given his views about
time, truth and concept-containment. If truth is concept-containment and concept-containment is  not a temporary
matter, how can there be temporary truths? 
2. How (not) to solve the Problem of Temporary Truths  
Among Leibniz's interpreters, the dominant view is that the Problem of Temporary Truths should be solved by
modifying  in  one  way  or  another  the  structure  of  predicative  sentences.  Based  on  this  view,  three  different
approaches have been proposed over the years, each targeting a different component of the sentence. 
One approach targets the predicate: it is argued that Leibniz could avoid the Problem of Temporary Truths
by adding to every predicate a temporal parameter. On this approach, instead of applying the concept-containment
doctrine to (A), Leibniz should apply it to (B):
(B) Elizabeth is queen-in-2017
(B) expresses the proposition that Elizabeth is queen-in-2017, which is true if and only if the concept  QUEEN-IN-
2017 is contained in the concept ELIZABETH. Since this is perfectly consistent with the concept ELIZABETH failing to
contain many other concepts – in particular, the concept QUEEN-IN-1945 – no contradiction arises from Elizabeth's
being queen now and not 70 years ago.  
A second approach targets the  subject:  the idea is  that Leibniz could avoid the Problem of Temporary
Truths by replacing substances with their temporal stages as the primary subjects of predication. On this approach,
the right replacement for (A) would not be (B), but (C):
(C) Elizabeth-in-2017 is queen
(C) expresses the proposition that Elizabeth's 2017-stage is queen, which is true if and only if the concept QUEEN is
contained in the concept of Elizabeth's present stage. This is perfectly consistent with the concept QUEEN not being
contained in  the concept  of  (some  of)  Elizabeth's  past  stages  – in  particular,  the 1945-stage.  So,  once again,
Elizabeth's change from being not-queen to being queen poses no threat to Leibniz's concept-containment doctrine. 
The third and last approach targets the copula. On this account, Leibniz should not say that A is P-at-t1 and
not P-at-t2. Nor should he say that A's t1-stage is P and A's t2-stage is not. Instead, he should say that A is-at-t1 P
even if it is not the case that A is-a-t2 P. So (A) should not be replaced by (B) or (C), but rather by (D): 
(D) Elizabeth is-in-2017 queen
The relativization here affects neither Elizabeth nor the property of being queen, but rather the relationship between
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the former and the latter.6 
The first approach – relativizing the predicate – is in line with the interpretation of the concept containment
doctrine proposed by Russell (2005, 51) and Broad (1949, 1975).7 The second approach – using temporal stages as
the primary subjects of predication – was first suggested by Mates (1989, 88-9) and has recently been revived by
Futch (2008, 137-8). The third approach – relativizing the copula – is the one Robert Adams advocates in Leibniz:
Determinists, Theist, Idealist (1994, 73). Each of these solutions has some advantages over the others. Ultimately,
though, none of them offers a satisfactory solution to the Problem of Temporary Truths. Let us see why. 
2.1. Relativizing the predicate
From a contemporary perspective, adding a temporal parameter to the predicate might seem the most obvious way
of avoiding the Problem of Temporary Truths. But there are at least two reasons for thinking that Leibniz would not
have pursued an approach of this kind. 
First of all,  while  Leibniz offers many examples of  temporary predicates (among others, 'being king',
'being general', 'being a winner', 'being well-taught', 'being strong' and 'being warm' (A6.4.553), 'being a disciple of
Aristotle' (A6.4.625), but also 'having been to Rome' (A6.4.596) and 'loving', which Leibniz distinguishes from the
future-tensed 'going to love' (A6.4.1336)), he never says, suggests or implies that a temporal parameter should be
added to them. Indeed, some of his remarks are directly in tension with this idea. Leibniz accepts the reality of
change (AG 214) and affirms on numerous occasions that change requires two contradictory predicates to be true
of the same substance at different moments of time (A6.4.556; A6.4.569; A6.4.629; A6.4.869). Since 'being P-at-t1'
and 'not being P-at-t2' are  not contradictory predicates, the present approach has the strange feature of removing
contradictoriness  precisely  from  where,  according  to  the  texts,  the  reality  of  change  requires that  there  be
contradictoriness. 
Second, adding a time parameter to every predicate (or at least to every temporary predicate) is tantamount
to building a time specification into every property (or at least into every temporary property). But, as Mates points
6 There is an immediate worry that this approach would not be applicable to all kinds of temporary truths:  'Peter loves' is
temporarily true, but it contains no copula. The worry quickly vanishes when it is realized that, according to Leibniz, the
copula is implicit in the verb whenever is not explicitly present in the surface structure of the sentence:  'The particle is is
necessary in language, whenever the verb is absent, but if the verb is present, it can be omitted, because it is hidden in it.
For example, I love [amo] means I am lover [sum amans]. So the verb is a word which includes the copula' (A6.4.882). See
also A6.4.596-7 and A6.4.865.
7 Cover & Hawthorne (1999, 168 and 174-5) take this approach seriously,  though they don't  explicitly endorse it.  Bella
thinks that “it matches well, indeed, with Leibniz’s way of speaking in several passages, like the end of the De Affectibus”
(2005, 223). 
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out, this move would undermine Leibniz's project of doing away with irreducible temporal properties and relations:
Leibniz defines the non simultaneity of two states of a substance as the inclusion in one of a property that is
lacking in the other, and it  is plain that in general he hopes to reduce temporal relations to nontemporal
properties of the relata; if qualities had time specifications built in, as it were, this would make no sense.
(Mates 1986, 89)
Note that the problem does not go away if, instead of building time specifications into properties – for example, by
distinguishing being  queen-in-1945 and  being  queen-in-2017 –  we  limit  ourselves  to  positing  a  plurality  of
temporally  unqualified properties  –  for  example,  being   queen1 and  being  queen2. A central  idea in  Leibniz's
discussion of irreducible temporal properties and relations is that the distinctions marked by such properties and
relations are not  genuine (in his correspondence with Clarke, for instance, Leibniz says that two universes that
differed from one another only with respect to the time of their creation would not be genuinely different – this is
why it is an impossible fiction 'to suppose that God might have created the world some millions of years sooner'
(AG 329)). If we replace being queen-in-1945 and being queen-in-2017 with being queen1 and being queen2, this
problem, far from disappearing, becomes more pressing. Since, by hypothesis, being queen1 and being queen2 have
no built-in time specifications, the distinction they are supposed to mark is – even more clearly than in the case of
being  queen-in-1945 and  being  queen-in-2017  –  a  distinction  without  a  difference.  In  short,  the  strategy  of
relativizing the predicate, besides being exegetically untenable, leads to a spurious and unLeibnizian multiplication
of attributes.
2.2. Temporal stages
As anticipated, Mates favours a different approach to the Problem of Temporary Truths, based on the replacement
of substances with their temporal stages as subjects of predication: 'I believe that Leibnizian statements to the effect
that an (incomplete) attribute or concept B is contained in a complete individual concept A are best interpreted as
meaning that the concept B is a component of the relevant t-states of the concept A' (Mates 1986, 89). 
One key advantage of this approach is that it is compatible with Leibniz's project of reducing temporal
relations to nontemporal properties of their relata. In fact, accepting an ontology of temporal stages would put
Leibniz in a better position to carry out the reduction, because it would provide him with a larger set of relata –
hence with a more generous reduction base. Distinguishing between Elizabeth's 1945-stage and Elizabeth's 2017-
stage is also, from a Leibnizian perspective, less objectionable than distinguishing between being queen-in-1945
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and being queen-in-2017 (or between being queen1 and being queen2): since Elizabeth undergoes qualitative change
between 1945 and 2017, her 1945-stage and her 2017-stage can be seen as two qualitatively discernible entities.
Still, Mates's proposal faces some serious problems. The idea of a substance having distinct temporal stages
is not foreign to Leibniz. Indeed, his definition of change as 'the aggregate of two contradictory states' (A6.4.556)
may be interpreted as alluding to that idea. Likewise, the doctrine of continuous creation, defended in the Theodicy,
could be taken to imply that a substance persists through time in virtue of God's constantly creating new stages of
it. But these readings are notoriously difficult to maintain.8 Leibniz's 'states' (status) are not stages in the proper
sense of the term, because they are accident-like rather than substance-like ('a state is a mutable attribute', Leibniz
says (A6.4.392)). Far from being able to replace substances as the primary subjects of predication, then, states are
among the things we must  predicate  of substances.  On the  other  hand, while  it  remains  controversial how to
interpret the doctrine of continuous creation, an interpretation requiring the existence of temporal stages is highly
implausible, given Leibniz's insistence that persisting substance should not be thought of as entia successiva.9
A further  problem with  Mates's  approach  is  that  it  would  not provide  Leibniz  with  a  solution  to  all
instances of the Problem of Temporary Truths. Replacing substances with their  stages might be the right way of
dealing with propositions expressed by sentences of the form 'A is B', where A is a substance and B a property. But
what about propositions expressed by sentences of the form 'All As are B'? Consider:
(a) All dinosaurs are extinct
Since dinosaurs became extinct about 65 million years ago, the proposition expressed by (a), which is now true,
was  false  100  million  years  ago.  But  according to  Leibniz,  the  truth  of  the  proposition  expressed  by  (a)  is
guaranteed by the fact that the concept EXTINCT is contained in the concept DINOSAUR.10 So the same question arises
again: given that the analytic containment of one concept in another is an eternal matter, how could the proposition
expressed by (a) be only temporarily true? Here a strategy appealing to temporal stages is of no help:  DINOSAUR
designates a property, not a substance, and properties, unlike substances, have no temporal stages.11  
2.3. Relativizing the copula
In  Leibniz:  Determinist,  Idealist,  Theist,  Adams rejects  Mates's  solution to  the Problem of Temporary Truths,
8 See McDonough (2007) and Whipple (2010).  
9 See, for instance, G VI 350. 
10 A more precise statement of the truth-conditions of universal truths like (a) is offered in § 4. 
11 We could, of course, substitute DINOSAUR with DINOSAUR-IN-2017 – but there are as many good reasons not to do that as 
there are not to substitute QUEEN with QUEEN-IN-2017.
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affirming that it is 'as contrary to Leibniz's way of speaking as imposing a temporal qualification on the properties'
(Adams 1994, 73). According to Adams, the best solution is to 'assign a time-index to the copula by which the
predicate is attached to the subject' (ibid.).
This strategy obviates the need to add a temporal parameter to predicates and does not require an ontology
of temporal stages. Furthermore, relativizing the copula puts one in a position to provide a uniform treatment of (A)
and (a). For just as one can replace (A) with (D), one can also replace (a) with (d): 
(d) All dinosaurs are-in-2017 extinct
The difference between adding a temporal parameter to the predicate and adding it to the copula is subtle, but
important. If the temporal parameter is added to the copula, it may be argued that the relativization does not affect
the concept expressed by the predicate, but rather the containment relation that the concept expressed by subject
bears to it: as Adams puts it, 'inconsistency will be avoided by saying that the individual concept of [Elizabeth]
contains in some way the predicates [“being queen”] and [“not being queen”],  but only with respect to different
times' (Adams, ibid.; my emphasis). 
The  question  is  whether  this  difference,  however  important,  is  sufficient  to  avoid  the   problems  that
relativizing the predicate gave rise to. Saying that the relation of concept-containment is time-relative seems to be a
way of saying that the instantiation-relation holding between a substance (e.g. Elizabeth) and its properties (e.g.
being queen) is time-relative. But if instantiation is time-relative, it becomes once again hard to see how Leibniz's
project of doing away with irreducibly temporal properties and relations could succeed – instantiation is, itself, a
certain kind of relation.
In addition, Adams's solutions seems to raise philosophical concerns of its own. If analytic relations have
been thought to be eternal  and unchanging, it  is  because they appear to be timeless or  atemporal, rather than
somehow time-relative. Just as it would seem awkward and unnatural to say that the relation between 2+2 and 4 is
not equaling but equaling-in-2017, it seems awkward and unnatural to say that the the relation between ELIZABETH
and QUEEN is not containing, but containing-in-2017. This is all the more so in a context where, as already noted,
analytic relations are supposed to reflect God's dispositions to think in certain ways rather than others.  Maybe,
contrary to what Adams suggests, there are ways of interpreting the addition of a time-index to the copula that do
not  call  into  question  the  timeless  and  atemporal  nature  of  concept-containment.  But  until  we  have  a  clear
conception  of  what  these  alternative  interpretations  might  be,  Adams's  solution  is,  at  the  very  least,  highly
problematic. 
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3. Getting rid of temporary truths?
The above discussion suggests that the three main strategies proposed so far to solve the Problem of Temporary
Truths – relativizing predicates, replacing substances with their stages as the primary subjects of predication and
relativizing the copula – face serious exegetical and philosophical difficulties. Where they do not openly contradict
the letter of Leibniz's writings, they are either incompatible with his views about the metaphysics of time and
persistence or incapable of solving all instances of the problem (or both).
If this diagnosis is correct, a more radical solution may appear to be called for: given that there does not
seem to be  any straightforward way of squaring Leibniz's  concept-containment  doctrine with the existence of
temporary truths, shouldn't we conclude that Leibniz did not accept the existence of temporary truths? A 'tenseless'
theory of propositions – a theory on which propositions can only be eternally true or eternally false – would not
only solve the Problem of Temporary Truths at the root, but it would also be consonant with Leibniz's reductionist
views about time – or so it might be argued.
There are three things to be said in response to this suggestion. The first is Leibniz's reductionist views
about time are neither here nor there with respect to the question whether propositions can be 'tensed'. Broadly
speaking, one can distinguish three components in Leibniz's reductionism about time. There is  Relationalism, the
doctrine that time is not  a substance distinct  from the events occurring in it,  but a system of relations among
events.12 There is the Causal Theory of Time, according to which temporal relations are grounded in causal relations
(so that – for instance – for an event x to precede another event y is for x to be (part of) the reason why y will
occur).13  And there is the thesis – call it Causal Intrinsicalism – according to which causal relations are grounded
in intrinsic properties of the relata.14 
A detailed discussion of these components and their interrelations would take us too far afield, but it is
crucial to see that each of them is perfectly compatible with the acceptance of a 'tensed' theory of propositions. For
a  'tensed'  theory  of  propositions  can  be  combined  with  each  the  following  three  claims:  (i)  that  the  most
fundamental  truths  about  the  universe  involve  nothing  about  the  absolute  position  of  events  in  time  (as  per
Relationalism); (ii) that if, e.g., p is true and q will be true, this is because p explains or contributes to the causal
explanation of q (as per the  Causal Theory of Time) and (iii) that that if p explains or contributes to the causal
12 Leibniz defends  Relationalism is his correspondence with Clarke. There and in several other places, he defines time  an
'order of successions' (AG 324). On many occasions, he explicitly says that time is a relation (NE II, 13, 17; G IV, 491-92;
568-69; GM VII, 242).  
13 The Causal Theory of Time is defended by Leibniz in the text Initia Rerum Mathematicarum Metaphysica. For a discussion
of this doctrine, see Arthur (1989), Cover (1997) and Futch (2008). 
14 Causal  Intrinsicalism can be shown to follow from Leibniz's  thesis  that  'there are no  purely extrinsic  denominations,
denominations which have absolutely no foundation in the very thing denominated' (AG 32). 
10
explanation of q, this is because of the intrinsic properties that p and q ascribe to their respective subjects (as per
Causal Intrinsicalism).15
The second thing to be said about the hypothesis that Leibniz embraced a 'tenseless' theory of propositions
is that the textual evidence tells heavily against it. Besides offering many examples of temporary predicates (as
already noted in § 2), Leibniz shows awareness of the distinction between 'tensed' and 'tenseless' interpretations of
the  present  indicative  when he distinguishes  two readings  of  'Peter  denies'  –  one  synonymous  with  'Peter  is
denying', the other with 'Peter sometimes denies' (A6.4.763). Further, Leibniz affirms that no proposition about an
object can change in truth-value unless there is an actual change in the object – a point that he would have had no
reason to  make had  he  not  believed  in  the existence of  propositions  that  change in  truth-value.16 Even  more
explicitly, Leibniz says that, among contingent propositions, there are some that 'are only true at a certain time', like
the propositions  that I am now alive or  that the sun shines (A6.4.1517). And a text from 1687-88 entitled  De
Lingua Philosophica contains a clear endorsement of the thesis that some propositions are only temporarily true: 
The  copula  is  always  tensed  [semper  includit  tempus  aliquod],  and  so  is  any  proposition  or  statement
[propositio seu enuntiatio] […]; and the reason why every statement [enuntiatio] is tensed [connotet tempus]
is this, that one and the same proposition can be true and false at different times, even if everything else [in it]
remains the same. (A6.4.882; my emphasis). 
Notice that in saying that the copula 'semper includit tempus aliquod' and that every statement 'connotet tempus'
Leibniz is not suggesting that we should think of the copula (or of other components of the statement) as involving
reference to times or intervals of time. 'Tempus' here refers to the grammatical category of tense, as shown by the
fact that, in the same paragraph, Leibniz uses this term to refer to a verb form (tempus quoddam Aoristum) inspired
by and modelled on the aorist tense of ancient Greek.17 Notice also that this passage commits Leibniz to the view
that  propositions (not sentences,  utterances or other kinds of linguistic items) can be temporarily true. Here as
elsewhere, Leibniz uses the terms propositio and enuntiatio interchangeably (Mates 1989, 53f), and refrains from
employing the Latin terms for “utterance” and “sentence” – which are, respectively, dictio (or locutio) and sermo
(or sensus). 
The third  and last  thing to  be  said  about  solving the Problem of Temporary Truths by getting rid  of
15 On this point – the compatibility of Leibniz's reductionism about time with a 'tensed' account of propositions – I entirely 
agree with Vailati (1997, 121)
16 See Mates (1989, 53). 
17 I submit that this is also the most charitable way of interpreting Leibniz's use of 'tempus' in the De Affectibus (A6.4.1441).
It may be asked what Leibniz's interpretation of the grammatical category of tense was, but – for reasons that should be
familiar at this point – it is unlikely to suppose that it involved any kind of time-indexing or time-relativization. Perhaps
Leibniz would have used tense to paraphrase away reference to times in roughly the way suggested by some contemporary
advocates of tense logic (see, for instance, Prior 1969). For some related speculations on the role of tense in Leibniz's logic,
see Øhrstrøm & Hasle (1995, 115-117). 
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temporary truths is that it is not really an alternative to the solutions considered in the previous section. For, while
the solutions considered in the previous section disagree on which particular sentence one should replace (A) with,
they all agree that (A) should be replaced, not with another temporary truth, but with some sentence expressing an
eternally true proposition. The proposition expressed by (B) is eternally true because, unlike the bare property of
being queen, the property of being queen-in-2017 is one that you either eternally have or eternally fail to have. The
proposition expressed by (C) is eternally true because Elizabeth's 2017-stage does not change over time – how
Elizabeth is in 2017 is settled once and for all. And the proposition expressed by (D) certainly seems to be eternally
true, for, subtleties aside, the meaning of (D) does not differ substantially from the meaning of (B). 
All this suggests a general lesson. The solutions discussed in the previous section are nothing else than
variations  on  the  two  main  strategies  a  metaphysician  has  at  her  disposal  to  reduce  'tensed'  propositions  to
'tenseless' ones – appealing to temporal parts or relativizing various components of the proposition to times or
intervals of time. If none of the solutions discussed in the previous sections can be made to work, the conclusion we
should draw is that there is not much leeway for ascribing to Leibniz a 'tenseless' theory of propositions. Not only is
such a theory not required by Leibniz's reductionist views about time and explicitly denied in his writings. More
likely than not, it is not even a theory that Leibniz – given his overall commitments – could have embraced.  
4. A different tack
Let us now try to be more constructive. If the approaches discussed so far do not work (§ 2) and ascribing to
Leibniz  a  'tenseless'  theory of  propositions  is  not  an option  (§ 3),  how should  we deal  with  the Problem of
Temporary Truths? As a first step towards an alternative solution, I suggest we should provide a more careful
formulation of Leibniz's concept-containment doctrine. Leibniz says that this doctrine applies not only to singular
truths,  but  also  to  “every  affirmative  truth,  universal  or  particular”  (AG 31).18 Clearly  this  cannot  mean  that
sentences like  'A is B', 'All As are B' and 'Some A is B' are all true if and only if A's concept contains B's concept.
What is the right way of formulating their truth-conditions in concept-containment terms, then? 
Let us start with singular propositions, i.e. propositions expressed by sentences of the form 'A is B'. It must
be admitted that there is something slightly inaccurate in saying (as I did at the outset of this paper) that, according
to Leibniz, the truth of these propositions consists in the analytic containment of the concept expressed by predicate
in  the  concept  expressed  by the  subject.  Strictly  speaking,  that  B's  concept  be  contained  in  A's  concept  is  a
18 See also AG 95. 
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necessary condition for truth, but not sufficient one. To see why, consider:
(E) The necessary body is necessary
The proposition expressed by (E) involves two concepts –  NECESSARY BODY and  NECESSARY – the first of which
contains the second. Yet Leibniz regards this proposition as false (G III,  443), on the ground that the concept
expressed by the subject (i.e. NECESSARY BODY) involves some kind of contradiction (for Leibniz, there is not and
cannot be such a thing as a necessary body).
Call concepts like  NECESSARY BODY inconsistent concepts  and concepts that do not involve any kind of
contradiction  consistent  concepts.  It  seems clear  that  only when a concept is  consistent  its  containing another
concept makes for the truth of the corresponding singular proposition. So I submit that the truth-conditions of
singular propositions should be stated, more cautiously, as follows: 
(C-S) The proposition that A is B is true iff A's concept is consistent and contains B's concept.
Next, let us consider particular propositions, i.e. propositions expressed by sentences of the form 'Some A
is B'. Obviously enough, the truth of these propositions cannot require that A's concept contain B's concept. For
then the truth of the proposition that some A is not B would require that A's concept contain the negation of B's
concept. And so the propositions that some A is B and that some A is not B could not be jointly true without A's
concept  being  inconsistent.  Leibniz's  solution  to  this  problem is  to  say  that  “if  the  proposition  is  particular
affirmative, then the predicate is not contained in the notion of the subject considered by itself, but in the notion of
the subject with something extra added; that is, the predicate is contained in some special case of the subject.” (AG
11). For instance, the proposition that some metal is gold is true if and only if “some metal, with some addition or
specification […] is of such a nature as to involve the nature of gold” (C 51), and not only if METAL contains GOLD.19
One simple way of implementing this suggestion is the following. Call a specification of a concept X any
concept that is either identical to X or contains X among its ingredients. Then the proposition  that some A is B
could be said to be true if and only if there is some specification of A's concept that contains B's concept. But not
just any specification will do – plausibly, in adding new ingredients to A, one should not be allowed to generate any
contradiction. The truth-conditions for particular propositions should therefore be stated as follows: 
(C-P) The proposition  that some  A is B is true iff  there is  some consistent specification of A's
concept which contains B's concept.
And now universal propositions, i.e. propositions expressed by sentences of the form 'All As are B'. Leibniz
says  that  “in  a  universal  affirmative  proposition,  it  is  obvious  that  the  predicate  is  contained  in  the  subject
considered by itself” (AG 11). But what does the expression 'considered by itself' mean in this context? Consider
19 For discussion of some potential difficulties with this solution, see Levey (2014, 113-117).
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the concept HUMAN and two consistent specifications of it, BLOND-HUMAN and NOT-BLOND-HUMAN. The first of these
specifications contains BLOND, while the second contains the negation of BLOND. What should we say about HUMAN
considered by itself, then?20 If we want the proposition that all humans are blond to come out false, two options
suggest themselves.  One option is to say that  HUMAN considered by itself contains  BLOND if  and only if  every
consistent specification of it does. Another option is to say that HUMAN considered by itself contains BLOND if and
only if no consistent specification of it contains  NOT-BLOND. Coordinately, we have two candidate clauses for the
truth-conditions of universal propositions: 
(C-U*) The proposition  that all  As are B is true iff every consistent specification of A's concept
contains B's concept.
(C-U) The proposition that all As are B is true iff no consistent specification of A's concept contains
the negation of B's concept.
(C-U) may seem more convoluted, but notice, given (C-P), it has the advantage of making 'All As are B' equivalent
to 'It is not the case that some A is not-B'. Since Leibniz accepts this equivalence (G VII 212; A6.4.780), I think we
should prefer it to (C-U*).21 
Now that  the  truth-condition  of  singular,  particular  propositions  and universal  propositions  have  been
clearly identified, we are in a position to make a crucial observation. Two notions are at play in (C-S), (C-P) and
(C-U) – not only the familiar notion of one concept  containing another, but also the notion of a concept being
consistent. For a singular proposition to be true, it is not enough that the subject contain the predicate – the subject
has to express a consistent concept. For a particular proposition to be true, it is not enough that some specification
of  the  subject  contains  the  predicate  –  the  relevant  specification  has  to  be  consistent.  And  for  a  universal
proposition to be true, it is not necessary that every specification of the subject's concept fail to contain the negation
of predicate's concept – only consistent specifications matter. This means that there is no immediate incompatibility
between the existence of temporary truths and the concept-containment doctrine. For even if the relation a concept
bears to its ingredients is eternal and unchanging, something else might still be temporary, namely whether that
concept (given, among other things, the eternal and unchanging ingredients it has) is consistent or inconsistent.
Could temporary truths depend for their temporariness on the temporariness of consistency?  
The suggestion may be met with scepticism. For how can a concept which is consistent at one time be
inconsistent at another unless it can gain or lose some of its ingredients over time? Moreover, if we allow concepts
20 Notice that the same question does not arise with individual concepts, because each individual concept admits of only one
specification, namely itself. 
21 At AG 16, Leibniz says that “from a universal affirmative follows a particular affirmative. Every wise person is pious.
Therefore some wise person is pious”. To accommodate this remark one could add to (C-U) that some specification of A's
concept should contain B's concept. Since nothing crucial hinges on this amendment, I will omit it for simplicity. 
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that are consistent to become inconsistent (or vice versa) shouldn't we also allow things that are possible to become
impossible  (or vice versa),  contrary to the thought  that  matters of  possibility and necessity are not  subject to
change? These questions are pressing, but, before trying to tackle them, I want to explain why, despite the problems
it faces, the approach I am suggesting deserves to be taken seriously. Treating consistency as a temporary feature of
(at least, some) concepts is not just the main or only residual option once the accounts reviewed in § 2 and 3 are set
aside. It is Leibniz's own views about propositions that exert significant pressure towards adopting this solution. 
4.1. The case for temporarily consistent concepts
Leibniz offers many examples of inconsistent concepts:  not only the concept of the necessary body, but also the
concept of the greatest speed (G III, 443), of 'the squaring of the circle', of 'the number of all possible units' and of
'the  greatest  circle  of  all'  (AG 238).  What  makes  these  concepts  inconsistent  is  the  fact  that  they 'involve  a
contradition' (AG 26). (The terms 'consistent' and 'inconsistent' are coined by Mates (1989, 67) – Leibniz only says
only that these concepts express 'false ideas' (AG 16) and characterizes them as 'unsuitable' (ineptus) (C 513) and
'pointless' (inutilis) (G VII 293)).  
The  question  whether  consistency  is  a  temporary  or  eternal  feature  of  concepts  is  one  that,  to  my
knowledge, Leibniz never explicitly addresses. Still, an argument can be made that, given his general views about
propositions, Leibniz  should have endorsed the view that (some) concepts are only temporarily consistent. Once
again, let us start with (A): 
(A) Elizabeth is queen
According to Leibniz, to say that Elizabeth is queen is tantamount to saying that it is Elizabeth the queen – rather
than any of the infinitely many counterparts of Elizabeth who are not queen – that exists in the actual world. This
means that the proposition expressed by (A) is equivalent in meaning (hereafter, more simply, 'equivalent') to the
proposition expressed by (A'):22
(A') Elizabeth-queen exists
But Leibniz allows us to go further than this. Just as we can transpose 'queen' into the subject term of (A) and
transform (A) into (A'), he thinks we can also transpose 'exists' into the subject term of (A') and transform (A') into
(A''): 
22 For this equivalence, see C 317. The other equivalences discussed in this section are endorsed by Leibniz in a text entitled 
De Propositionibus Existentialibus (A6.4.1631-3). In what follows, I will mostly leave implicit the specification 'the 
proposition expressed by...'. 
15
(A'') Elizabeth-queen-existing is 
Notice that this is just a special case of transforming a sentence of the form 'A is B' into a sentence  of the form 'AB
is', when the predicate involved is 'exists'. For reasons that will become clear later on (§ 4.2), transformations of
this kind may  appear to turn contingent claims into necessary ones. But, as Leibniz himself points out (C 271;
A6.4.1632), this appearance is misleading and propositions like (A'') are, in fact, equivalent to propositions like
(A'). By transitivity, then, (A), (A') and (A'') are all equivalent to one another.
Now, we know that, in sentences like (A''), which result from transposing the existence predicate into the
subject term, 'is' means 'is an ens' or 'is a possibile', where saying that x is an ens or is a possibile is tantamount to
saying that x's concept is consistent (I will explain later why I prefer to leave these terms untranslated):
An ens or possibile is what does not involve A not A. (A6.4.631) 
A non-ens or impossibile is what involves a contradiction (A6.4.935)
Something is a possibile if no falsehood follows from positing it, that is to say, if it does not imply any contradiction.
(A6.4.277)
So we reach the following, conditional conclusion: if (A) is temporarily true, the concept ELIZABETH-QUEEN-EXISTING
must be only temporarily consistent. For (A) is equivalent to (A'') and (A'') asserts that Elizabeth-queen-existing is
an ens, which is just another way of saying that the concept ELIZABETH-QUEEN-EXISTING is consistent. A temporary
truth like (A) requires the existence of a temporarily consistent concept.
An analogous line of reasoning applies also to temporary universal truths and temporary particular truths.
As an example from the former category, take again (a):  
(a) All dinosaurs are extinct
According to Leibniz, to say that all dinosaurs are extinct is tantamount to saying that no non-extinct dinosaurs
exist in the actual world (there could, of course, be non-extinct dinosaurs in other possible worlds). This means that
(a) is equivalent to (a'):
(a') Dinosaur-not-extinct does not exist
But here too, as before, the existence predicate can be transposed into the subject term and (a') can be transformed
into (a''): 
(a'') Dinosaur-not-extinct-existing is not  
What (a'') asserts is that dinosaur-not-extinct-existing is not an ens or possibile, which is just another way of saying
that the concept DINOSAUR-NOT-EXTINCT-EXISTING is inconsistent. But (a'') is equivalent to (a') and, by transitivity, to
(a). So, given the temporary truth of (a), (a'') itself is only temporarily true and the concept DINOSAUR-NOT-EXTINCT-
EXISTING is only temporarily inconsistent. 
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Finally, consider a particular truth like (a): 
(a) Some humans are saved
Given that no human was saved before Jesus's death on the cross, (a), which is now true, was false 3000 years ago.
But (a) is equivalent to (a') and (a''):
(a') Human-saved exists
(a'') Human-saved-existing is 
So (a'') itself, which asserts the consistency of the concept HUMAN-SAVED-EXISTING, must be temporarily true. Hence
HUMAN-SAVED-EXISTING is a temporarily consistent concept.
The arguments I  just offered rely on treating  EXISTENCE on a par with a proposition's other ingredients.
Against this, one might invoke the thesis, defended by Mates  (1986, 74f and 112f), that  EXISTENCE provides an
exception to the concept-containment doctrine. But this thesis is untenable. Occasionally, Leibniz says that the
predicate “exists” does not apply to created substances essentially or by definition (AG 19). But he never says that,
unlike other predicates and in violation of the concept-containment doctrine, “exists” is not contained in every
subject of which it can be truly predicated. In fact, he suggests the opposite. For he is adamant that “when it is said
that something exists […], this existence itself is the predicate; that is, the notion of existence is linked with the
idea in question, and there is a connection between these two notions” (A6.6.358).
My arguments also rely on the principle that, if p is equivalent to q, p is temporarily true if and only if q is.
In the context of Leibniz's philosophy, this principle strikes me as relatively uncontroversial: it is hard to see how
by 'unpacking' and 'reshuffling' concepts – which is all analytic transformations allow us to do – one could turn a
truth that is temporary into one that is not, or vice versa. At any rate, if we apply the concept-containment doctrine
to (A), (a) and (a), we can show independently that their truth-conditions coincide with those of (respectively)
(A''), (a'') and (a''). Very briefly:
 Given (C-S),  (A) is  true iff  (A'')  is.  Left-to-right:  if  (A)  is  true,  Elizabeth's  concept  is  consistent  and
contains both  QUEEN and EXISTING. But if Elizabeth's concept is consistent and contains both  QUEEN and
EXISTING, the concept ELIZABETH-QUEEN-EXISTING is consistent, and (A'') is true. Right-to-left: if (A'') is true,
there is a concept which is consistent, contains QUEEN and is Elizabeth's concept, so (A) is true. 
 Given (C-U), (a) is true iff (a'') is. Left-to-right: if (a) is true, no consistent specification of the concept
EXISTING-DINOSAUR contains the concept NOT-EXTINCT. But then the concept DINOSAUR-NOT-EXTINCT-EXISTING
must  be  inconsistent,  and  (a'')  is  true.  Right-to-left:  if  (a'')  is  true,  every specification of  the concept
EXISTING-DINOSAUR containing the concept NOT-EXTINCT is inconsistent, so (a) is true.
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 Finally, given (C-P), (a) is true iff (a'')  is. Left-to-right: if  (a) is true, there is some consistent way of
specifying the concept  HUMAN-EXISTING that contains the concept  SAVED.  But  then the concept  HUMAN-
SAVED-EXISTING must be consistent and (a'') true. Right-to-left: if is (a'') true, at least one specification of
the concept HUMAN-EXISTING is consistent (namely, HUMAN-SAVED-EXISTING), and so (a) is true.
To sum up, against the backdrop of Leibniz's general theory of propositions and concept-containment doctrine, the
temporariness of singular, particular and temporary truths turns out to require and be required by the temporary
consistency (or inconsistency) of certain concepts.  Given his acceptance of 'tensed' propositions,  it  seems that
Leibniz  should escape the Problem of Temporary Truths by claiming that  some concepts are only temporarily
consistent. This solution would  not require the relativization of properties to times or intervals of time, nor the
replacement of substances with their stages as the primary bearers of properties. It would also provide Leibniz with
a uniform solution to all instances of the problem, for all truths to which the concept-containment doctrine applies
can be transformed into truths of the form 'A1, A2...An is (not)' – truths asserting the consistency (or inconsistency)
of a concept having as its ingredients A1, A2...An.23 The question at this point should be: can we make sense of
temporary consistency, without doing violence to other aspects of Leibniz's thought? 
4.2. Making sense of temporary consistency
As far as I can see, the suggestion that we should treat consistency as a temporary feature of concepts faces at least
three challenges. First, there is a challenge of showing how consistency can be a temporary feature of concepts if
matters of possibility and necessity are eternal and unchanging. Second, there is a challenge of explaining how a
concept can be temporarily consistent if its ingredients do not change over time. Third, there is a challenge of
squaring the temporariness of consistency with Leibniz's views about concepts – in particular, complete individual
concepts. In explaining how I think these challenges could be met, I will try to be upfront about the costs of the
solution to the Problem of Temporary Truths I am putting forward. While a full assessment of such costs falls
beyond the scope of this paper, my hope is to show that they do not deprive the proposal of its philosophical and
exegetical interest. As should be clear at this point,  no solution to the Problem of Temporary Truths is without
costs.  And if  the arguments  I  offered in the  last  section are sound, Leibniz's  theory of propositions indirectly
commits him to treating consistency as a temporary feature of concepts, given his acceptance of temporary truths. 
23 The transformations offered at G VII 212 and A6.4.780 allows one to transform even negative singular, universal and 
particular truths into truths of the form  'A1, A2...An is (not)'.
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Consistency and possibility – Let me start with the worry that, if (some) concepts are only temporarily consistent,
(some) things must be only temporarily possible, contrary to the natural thought that matters of possibility are not
subject to change. The worry may be motivated by the principle that the possibility of something requires the
consistency  of  its  concept  or,  equivalently,  that  “a  subject  whose  concept  is  contradictory  is  not  possible”
(Rodriguez-Pereyra and Lodge 2011, 233).
Leibniz's  treatment  of  iterated  and  mixed  modalities  raises  delicate  issues,24 but  I  agree  that  if  the
temporariness  of  consistency implied the  temporariness  of  possibility  the  present  approach  would  raise more
problems than it solves. Fortunately, though, there is good reason to think that, in the context of Leibniz's thought,
consistency and possibility should not be equated with one another – this why, earlier on, I preferred not to translate
Leibniz's “possibile” as “possible”. 
Consider  again the  concept  of  a  Elizabeth-not-queen's  existing,  i.e.  ELIZEBETH-NOT-QUEEN-EXISTING.  For
Leibniz, this concept is inconsistent (its inconsistency follows from the falsity of  “Elizabeth is not queen” and the
equivalence between this sentence, “Elizabeth-not-queen exists” and “Elizabeth-not-queen-existing is”, the latter of
which ascribes consistency to the concept of Elizabeth-not-queen existing). Yet we know that Elizabeth-not-queen
could exist, for Elizabeth is not necessarily queen. So we have a straightforward counterexample to the following
schema:
It is possible that A is B → AB is an ens or possibile (i.e. the concept of A being B is consistent)
Given what Leibniz means by “ens or possibile”, this should not come as a surprise. As we've seen, for AB to be an
ens or possibile is for the concept of A being B not to imply any contradiction. But, on Leibniz's infinite-analysis
account  of  contingency,  for  it  to  be  possible  that  A be  B is  for  the  concept  of  A being B not  to  imply any
contradiction in a finite number of steps. So consistency is stronger than possibility, because a concept can imply a
contradiction  without  implying  it  in  a  finite  number  of  steps.  The  concept  ELIZABETH-NOT-QUEEN-EXISTING is
inconsistent, because it implies something false (i.e. that Elizabeth is not queen) and, for Leibniz, any falsehood is
some  kind  of  unanalyzed  contradiction.  Nevertheless,  that  concept  expresses  something  possible,  because  no
contradiction could be derived from it in a finite number of steps. 
The point can be put, more clearly,  as follows. Call an inconsistent concept  explicitly inconsistent if it
implies a contradiction in a finite number of steps and implicitly inconsistent if it doesn't. Implicitly inconsistent
concepts  are inconsistent – so they do not designate entia or  possibilia. But they are implicitly inconsistent – so
they designate something possible. The schema above is, therefore, invalid – it fails whenever the concept of A
being B is implicitly inconsistent.  
24 See Lenzen (2004). 
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These subtle distinctions were never  explicitly drawn by Leibniz – in fact,  Leibniz's  choice of calling
'possibile'  the referent  of a consistent concept invites precisely the kind of confusion between consistency and
possibility that I am arguing against. But it would be hard to make sense of some of Leibniz's remarks without
assuming these distinctions. In the Calculus Ratiocinator, for example, Leibniz says that “something is a possibile
if no falsehood follows from positing it, that is to say, if it does not imply any contradiction” (A6.4.277). Now,
every false proposition implies a contradiction, whether in a finite or infinite number of steps. So, if being possible
implied being a possibile, Leibniz's claim would imply the absurd result that no falsehood expresses a possibility. 
What's more, Leibniz himself offers us counterexamples to the schema above, warning us against thinking
that, if the concept of A being B involves a contradiction, it is impossible that A be B. In a text from 1688 entitled
De Propositionibus  Existentialibus,  Leibniz  considers  three  examples  of  implicitly  inconsistent  concepts:  the
concept of an existing pious man not being oppressed (pius existens non tribulatus), the concept of an existing
abandoned just man (justus derelictus existens) and the concept of an existing man who does not sin (homo existens
non peccans) (A6.4.1632). Leibniz says that the referents of these concepts are 'non entia' or 'impossibilia', but, as
soon as he does that, he also emphasizes that, according to his position on matters of possibility and necessity, there
could exist non-oppressed pious men, abandoned just men and men who do not sin. He does not call the concepts
of such men “implicitly inconsistent” (the label is mine, not Leibniz's), but he does say that what they designate is
only “hypothetically impossible” and defends the coherence of his position by appealing to the infinite-analysis
account of contingency.
To go back to our original problem, then, the principle that a subject whose concept is inconsistent is not
possible should be rejected. Without such a principle, there is no direct route from the thesis that consistency is a
temporary feature of (some) concepts to the problematic claim that (some) things are only temporarily possible.
Only the thesis that explicit consistency is temporary would lead to such a result, and nothing in the present account
commits Leibniz to that thesis. 
Consistency and eternal ingredients – A second argument against treating consistency as a temporary feature of
concepts goes as follows. Recall that for a concept to be consistent is for it not to involve any contradiction. On the
face of it, this definition implies that for a concept to be inconsistent is for it to include among its ingredients two
concepts that contradict one another. But I have been assuming that the ingredients of a concept cannot change over
time. So it would seem impossible to explain how one and the same concept could change from being consistent to
being inconsistent, or vice versa.  
The argument touches on a crucial point. I agree that, if for a concept to be inconsistent were for it to
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include contradictory ingredients, the temporariness of consistency would be incompatible with the eternal and
unchanging nature of containment relations. But the idea of reducing a concept's inconsistency to its including
contradictory ingredients – herafter: the 'inclusion model' of inconsistency – strikes me as fundamentally mistaken. 
One basic problem with it is that it makes it very hard to see how there could be what I called “implicitly
inconsistent concepts”. If a concept C is implicitly inconsistent no contradiction can be derived from C in a finite
number of  steps.  But  suppose  that  for  C to  be  inconsistent  were for  it  to  literally  include  two contradictory
ingredients, A and not-A. Then there is no reason why it should take us infinitely many steps to come across these
ingredients in our analysis – we might, as it were, stumble upon them after a finite number of substitutions. In other
words, the inclusion model plays a villain's part in generating the well-known Problem of Lucky Proof, as applied
to false propositions.25 
Even more worryingly, the inclusion model of inconsistency makes it very easy to prove true all sorts of
falsehoods. For example, consider the false proposition expressed by: 
(a*) Not all dinosaurs are extinct
For  Leibniz,  the  falsity  of  (a*)  depends  on  the  implicit  inconsistency of  the  concept  DINOSAURS-NOT-EXTINCT-
EXISTING. If the inclusion model is correct, this means that the concept  DINOSAUR-NOT-EXTINCT-EXISTING includes
contradictory  ingredients.  But  what  are  these  ingredients?  Considered  by  themselves,  neither  the  concept  of
existence  (i.e.  EXISTING)  nor  the  concept  a  possible  not-extinct-dinosaur  (i.e.  DINOSAUR-NOT-EXTINCT)  are
inconsistent, so their conjunction can only include contradictory ingredients if the latter includes the negation of the
former (i.e. NOT-EXISTING). But now take the concept of a possible not-extinct dinosaur, remove from it the concept
NOT-EXISTING, and add to it the concept EXISTING. Certainly it must be possible to construct a concept in this way –
indeed, the concept in question must exist already, for it's the concept one would have used to think of non-extinct
dinosaurs at the time when dinosaurs were not extinct; and it must be a consistent concept, since, by hypothesis, we
removed from it any source of inconsistency. So the embarrassing question arises why we couldn't use that concept
to prove (a*), contrary to the assumption that (a*) is false. Call this the Problem of Spurious Truths.
 Now, something must be badly awry in a model that allows us to generate such straightforward problems
for the concept-containment doctrine as the Problem of Lucky Proof and the Problem of Spurious Truths. If we are
to take that doctrine seriously, we should, I think, abandon the inclusion model altogether. Instead, we have to
understand  and  apply  to  inconsistency  the  'approximation  model'  suggested  by  Leibniz  in  passages  like  the
following: 
A contingently true proposition cannot be reduced to identities, but can nevertheless be proved, by showing that,
25 For discussion, see, among others, Hawthorne & Cover (2000), Rodriguez-Pereyra & Lodge (2011) and Steward (2014).  
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as one pushes the analysis further and further, one approximates the identities more and more, but never reaches
them. (A6.4.776; my emphasis)
Just as a contingent truth is one that, when analysed, can be shown to constantly approximate (but never reach) an
identity, an implicitly inconsistent concept is one that, when analysed, can be shown to constantly approximate (but
never reach) a contradiction. It is only in this sense that implicitly inconsistent concepts 'involve' a contradiction.
There is no chance of being lucky and hitting upon the contradictory ingredients – nor any possibility of generating
spurious truths by removing or replacing them – because the concept includes no contradictory ingredients, in the
strict sense of the term. 
It might be objected that, even if we can make sense of the approximation model and abandon the inclusion
model in its favour, the original problem does not go away. If the ingredients of a concept do not change over time,
why should an analysis of that concept approximate a contradiction at one time and not at another? 
I  admit  that  Leibniz's  writings  provide no satisfactory answer to  this  question.  But  I  want  to  make a
qualification and advance a tentative suggestion. The qualification is that, if there is a difficulty here, it does not
arise specifically from the claim that consistency is a temporary feature of concepts. Consider again: 
(A'') Elizabeth-queen-existing is 
(a'') Dinosaur-not-extinct-existing is not  
(a'') Human-saved-existing is 
On any reconstruction of the infinite-analysis account of contingency– and independently of the arguments offered
above for the equivalence of (A''), (a'') and (a'') with, respectively, (A), (a) and (a) – these propositions (which
predicate consistency or inconsistency of various concepts) come out contingently true.26 This means that – whether
or not consistency is a temporary feature of concepts – Leibniz did not think of it as a mere function of a concept's
ingredients: while concepts have their ingredients necessarily, they are not necessarily consistent (or inconsistent).
An objector may regard this result as incoherent. But, once the inclusion model is set aside, it falls upon him or her
to explain exactly why we should so regard it. 
The tentative suggestion is precisely that, with the approximation model in place, the result need  not be
seen  as  incoherent.  One natural  thought  here starts  with  the  observation  that  Leibniz's  notion of  existence is
comparative in nature – it designates 'the difference between the degree of reality [or perfection] of each thing and
the degree of reality [or perfection] of its opposite' (A6.4.1354). If we allow this margin of (greater or lesser) to
change over time, it is not hard to see how a concept might change from being consistent to being inconsistent (or
26 This is either because (A''), (a'') and (a'') involve infinitely complex concepts (Steward 2014) or infinitely many 
inclinations (Hawthorne & Cover 2000), or because they require infinitely long 'consistency checks' (Rodriguez-Pereyra & 
Lodge 2011) or because they involve the notion of existence [Anonymous 2012]. 
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viceversa) without any change in its ingredients. Take again the concept ELIZABETH-QUEEN-EXISTING. The possibility
represented by this concept must be presently superior to all its alternatives – otherwise God would not presently
allow Elizabeth to be queen. But 70 years ago, a thorough analysis of all the implications of that very possibility
would have revealed it to be less perfect than the possibility of Elizabeth's not being queen – otherwise, God would
have made Elizabeth queen earlier than he actually did. This is just to say that 70 years ago a contradiction was, as
it were, latent in the concept ELIZABETH-QUEEN-EXISTING that is not latent in it today. In Leibniz's terminology: the
concept was 'pointless' (ineptus, inutilis), but it no longer is.  
The suggestion assumes that, whenever the notion of existence is included in a concept, the consistency of
that concept will be a function, not just of its ingredients, but also of its associated margin of perfection. This is no
more than a highly speculative conjecture. But remember that our task here is not to find a solution to the Problem
of Temporary Truths directly supported by Leibniz's writings – there is no such solution. Our task is to outline a
way in which Leibniz could avoid the problem without giving up the concept-containment doctrine. The present
approach does exactly this. Pending an argument that we cannot coherently fill in its details (or that we cannot do
so without raising problems that Leibniz's doctrines would not otherwise raise), we have every reason to take it
seriously.
Consistency and complete individual concepts – There is a third problem with the idea of treating consistency as a
temporary feature of concepts. It  plausibly follows from this idea that any changing substance must fall under
different complete individual concepts as time passes. To see why, take the proposition p which expresses the
complete truth about Elizabeth at the present time t. If p is a temporary truth, there must be a time t' – earlier or
later than t – at which p is not true. But if p is not true at t', Elizabeth's complete individual concept at t – call it C –
must be inconsistent at t'. Yet at every instant of her existence Elizabeth must fall under some consistent complete
concept. Hence there must  be a concept C',  distinct from C, that Elizabeth falls under at t'.  So throughout her
existence Elizabeth must fall under at least two distinct complete individual concepts, C and C'. In fact, supposing
that the complete truth about Elizabeth at any instant of her existence is only true of Elizabeth at that instant (i.e.
that Elizabeth is subject to constant change) and that there are infinitely many instants in Elizabeth's existence, it
follows that throughout her existence Elizabeth must fall under infinitely many complete individual concepts. 
This result gives pause. Most interpreters would agree that, for Leibniz, every substance must fall under the
same complete concept throughout its existence. If  the present approach conflicts with such a basic and central
aspect  of  Leibniz's  views about  concepts,  it's  unclear  why we should prefer  it  to  other,  equally  unLeibnizian
solutions – for example, denying that containment relations are eternal and unchanging. 
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Let me address this last point first. In § 1, I suggested that, if concept-containment relations reflect God's
dispositions to think in certain ways, they cannot be sensibly said to change over time. I surmise that, at this point
of our discussion, such worry may be dismissed as indecisive, for if there are temporary truths (as Leibniz believed)
and God has knowledge of them (as his omniscience requires), there is in any case a problem of reconciling the
temporariness of the former with the timeless nature of the latter. Let that be granted. I think we are now in a
position to see that allowing concepts to change their ingredients would not advance matters in the least. Suppose
that QUEEN is presently contained in Elizabeth's complete individual concept C, but was not contained in it 70 years
ago. It seems clear that 70 years ago we could have entertained (or, at any rate, constructed) some other concept C*
containing exactly all the ingredients that Elizabeth's complete individual concept C presently contains, including
QUEEN.  If C is presently consistent and consistency is an eternal function of a concept's ingredients, C* (which
exactly resemble how C presently is) must have been consistent 70 years ago. But if C* was consistent back then,
why couldn't we have used that concept to prove the truth of 'Elizabeth is queen'? Reflection on this variation of the
Problem of  Spurious  Truths  brings  us  back  to  square  one.  The  move  of  allowing  concepts  to  change  their
ingredients achieves nothing, unless we also treat consistency and inconsistency as temporary rather than eternal.
The question remains whether we have good reasons for upholding the traditional view that substances do
not fall under different complete individual concepts as time passes. I cannot hope to settle that question here, but
the textual evidence on this point seems to me to be, at best, inconclusive. 
The locus classicus of Leibniz's views on complete individual concepts is the Discourse on Metaphysics.
Here it is said that “the nature of an individual substance or of a complete being is to have a notion so complete that
it is sufficient to contain and to allow us to deduce from it all the predicates of the subject to which this notion is
attributed”  (AG 41).  This  statement  implies  that  each  individual  substance  must  have  a complete  individual
concept,  not  that  each  individual  substance  must  eternally  fall  under  the  same individual  concept.  It's  true,
throughout the Discourse, and in many other writings, Leibniz always speaks of the complete individual concept of
a substance – but this might simply mean that every individual substance has at most one complete individual
concept at each moment of its existence (something which is perfectly compatible with the view we are exploring),
not that each substance has at most one complete individual concept  throughout its existence (which is what the
present view must deny).27
27 On one occasion, Leibniz says that Peter's salvation is contained in his 'eternal possible notion' (AG 32). But this remark, 
too, does not settle the question whether Peter falls under different complete individual concepts at different moments of his
existence. In speaking of Peter's 'eternal' possible notion, Leibniz could be referring to a concept that describes Peter's life 
sub specie aeternitatis and that Peter falls under throughout his existence. On the view we are exploring, this concept 
would be distinct from any of Peter's complete individual concepts. Alternatively, the expression 'eternal possible notion' 
could refer to Peter's complete individual concept – in this case, the adjective 'eternal' would merely signal the fact that, for 
any time t, Peter's complete individual concept at t specifies everything that has happened to Peter before t and will happen 
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Leibniz's exchange with Arnauld contains a famous passage which might be thought to make trouble for
the view that substances can switch concepts over time:  
There must necessarily be an [a priori] reason allowing us truly to say that we endure, that is to say that I, who
was in Paris, am now in Germany.  [...] Now, it is not possible to find any reason but the fact that both my
attributes in the preceding time and state and my attributes in the succeeding time and state are predicates of the
same subject—they are in the same subject. Now, what is it to say that the predicate is in the subject, except that
the notion of the predicate is  in some way included in the notion of the subject?  And since,  once I began
existing, it was possible truly to say of me that this or that would happen to me, it must be admitted that these
predicates were laws included in the subject or in my complete notion, which constitutes what is called I, which
is the foundation of the connection of all  my different states and which God has known perfectly from all
eternity. (AG 73)
On one reading of it, this passage says that Leibniz's diachronic identity (i.e. the identity of the person who was in
Paris with the person who is in Germany) requires the diachronic identity of its complete concepts (i.e. the identity
of the concept LEIBNIZ-IN-PARIS with the concept  LEIBNIZ-IN-GERMANY). But this is not the only possible reading,
nor the most plausible. On an alternative reading, the a priori reason allowing us to say that Leibniz endures is that,
when he is in Paris, his concept contains 'will be in Germany' (i.e. an attribute of his succeeding state) and, when he
is in Germany, his concept contains 'was in Paris' (i.e. an attribute of the preceding state). Leibniz's concept in Paris
and Leibniz's concept in Germany need not be one and the same. The alternative reading is more plausible because
it does not commit a nominalist like Leibniz to the odd view that the endurance of substances is grounded in the
endurance of concepts. Leibniz's official doctrine on this matter was rather different: a substance endures in virtue
on there being a unique law of the series governing its changes, where a substance's law of the series corresponds,
roughly, to its essence or entelechy – not to something as ideal as a concept.28 
In effect, what Leibniz says about complete individual concepts is more than just  compatible with their
temporariness. Even setting aside the arguments I offered in the last section for thinking that Elizabeth's concept
must be temporarily consistent if (A) is to be temporarily true, some of Leibniz's remarks seem to imply this result
directly. In Primary Truths, we are told that 'the complete or perfect notion of an individual substance contains all
of its predicates, past, present, and future' (AG 32). Note that Elizabeth's predicates presently include 'being queen',
while 70 years ago they included 'not being queen'. How could a single concept contain both the predicate 'being
queen'  and the predicate 'not being queen'? Leibniz never says that the complete individual concepts of existing
substances contain contradictions.29 Yet he thinks that substances are subject to change and that change requires
to him after t, and not just what happens to him at t.
28 See, for instance, G II 263.
29 The suggestion is briefly considered and discarded by Curley (1982, 321). 
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contradictory predicates to be true of the same substance (A6.4.556; A6.4.569; A6.4.629; A6.4.869). Given that that
concept-containment itself cannot be relativized to times (§ 2.3), I find it hard to see how Leibniz could possibly
avoid the conclusion that Elizabeth's complete individual concept in 2017 is distinct from Elizabeth's complete
individual concept in 1945. Not only is this not a distinction without a difference (the two concepts have different
ingredients); it is a distinction that Leibniz has to draw (the ingredients in question are literally incompatible). 
I  acknowledge that  – setting aside  the question of its exegetical  coherence – there remains something
unappealing in the claim that individual substances must fall under different concepts at different times. A one-one
mapping between enduring substances and enduring concepts would be more natural. But if this turned out to be
the main cost of treating consistency as a temporary feature of concepts, the present approach might well remain
the best (if not the only) live option for someone sharing Leibniz's views on truth, time and concept-containment. 
6. Conclusion
A tension lies at the heart of Leibniz's theory of truth. If truth is concept-containment, it can only be eternal. And
yet truth is  not eternal – propositions can change their truth-value with the passage of time. I have argued that
Leibniz could resolve this tension in two steps. First, by properly qualifying the concept-containment doctrine: the
truth of a proposition depends not only on the eternal and unchanging containment-relations among concepts, but
also on certain concepts being consistent (or inconsistent). Second, by treating consistency as a temporary feature
of concepts – with the passage of time, consistent concepts can become inconsistent and vice versa. This solution
finds  independent  (albeit  indirect)  support  in  Leibniz's  theory  of  propositions  and,  unlike  more  traditional
approaches to the Problem of Temporary Truths, it  does full justice to his acceptance of  'tensed' propositions.
Treating consistency as a temporary feature of concepts, however, puts considerable pressure on Leibniz's views
about possibility, concept-containment and complete individual concepts. My discussion of these issues is just a
first step in a hard-to-navigate territory, but I hope to have shown that there is no fundamental incoherence between
Leibniz's overall commitments and the idea of temporary consistency. Whether this idea really holds the best or
only key to solving the Problem of Temporary Truths – and what can be learned from its success or failure – are
questions left for future investigation.  
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